EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY

Generously hosted by Study Center Gerzensee

PROGRAMME

WEEK 1

Monday, 2 July

Focus Session on Markets for Information

08.30 – 09.30  Test Design and Minimum Standards  
* Andy Skrzypacz (Stanford University)

09.30 – 10.00  Coffee break

10.00 – 11.00  Quantifying information and uncertainty  
* Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago)

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 – 21.30  Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes  
* Alex Smolin (University of Bonn)

Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition  
* Annie Liang (University of Pennsylvania), with Xiaosheng Mu  
(Columbia University) and Vasilis Syrgkanis (Microsoft Research)

Tuesday, 3 July

Morning Session

08.30 – 09.30  Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion  
* Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University), with Kyungmin (Teddy) Kim and Konrad Mierendorff

Evening Parallel Session

20.30 – 21.30  Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment: An Information Design Approach  
* Vasiliki Skreta (University College London and CEPR), with Laura Doval (California Institute of Technology)

Demand for Privacy, selling consumer information, and consumer hiding vs. opt-out  
* Simon Anderson (University of Virginia and CEPR)
**Wednesday, 4 July**

**Focus Session on Markets for Information**

08.30 – 09.30 | Privacy Protection and Consumer Retention  
* Bruno Jullien (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR) and Mike Riordan (Columbia University)

09.30 – 10.00 | Coffee Break

10.00 – 11.00 | Price Customization and Targeting in Many-to-Many Matching Markets  
* Renato Gomes (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR) and Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University and CEPR)

**Evening Parallel Session**

20.30 – 21.30 | Information aggregation and the efficiency of emissions markets  
* Estelle Cantillon (ECARES and CEPR)  
The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion  
* Piotr Dworczak (University of Chicago)

**Thursday, 5 July**

**Morning Session**

08.30 – 09.30 | Information Acquisition and Use by Networked Players  
* David Myatt (London Business School) and Chris Wallace (University of Manchester)

**Evening Parallel Sessions**

20.30 – 21.30 | Social Learning in a Dynamic Environment  
* Benjamin Golub (Harvard University), with Krishna Dasaratha (Harvard University) and Nir Hak (Harvard University)  
Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Heterogeneous Markets  
* Alex Tahbaz-Salehi (Northwestern University)

**Friday, 6 July**

**Morning Session**

08.30 – 09.30 | Information Design: Insights from Orderings of Dependence and Heterogeneity  
* Margaret A Meyer (Oxford University and CEPR)

**Morning Session**

10.00 – 11.00 | Revenue Guarantee Equivalence  
* Benjamin Brooks (University of Chicago), with Stephen Morris and Dirk Bergemann  
The Effect of Analyst Coverage on Corporate Voluntary Disclosure, Price Efficiency and Liquidity  
* Ilan Kremer (Hebrew University), with Sivan Frenkel (Tel Aviv University) and Ilan Guttman (NYU)

* Indicates the presenter
## WEEK 2

### Monday, 9 July

**Focus Session on Misspecified Models**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Speaker(s)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08.30</td>
<td>Data-Driven Regulation: Theory and Application</td>
<td>*Sylvain Chassang (New York University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>09.30</td>
<td>Overabundant Information and Learning Traps</td>
<td>*Annie Liang (University of Pennsylvania), with Xiaosheng Mu (Columbia University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>Coffee break</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference</td>
<td>*George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)</td>
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**Evening Parallel Sessions**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>Adverse Selection in Distributive Politics</td>
<td>*S. Nageeb Ali (Penn State University)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I Don’t Know</td>
<td>*Matthew Backus (Columbia University)</td>
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### Tuesday, 10 July

**Morning Session**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08.30</td>
<td>Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning</td>
<td>*Philipp Strack (University of California, Berkeley and CEPR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>The Culture of Overconfidence</td>
<td>*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University of Texas, Austin and CEPR) with Caroline Thomas (University of Texas, Austin)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies</td>
<td>*Klaus M. Schmidt (University of Munich and CEPR)</td>
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### Wednesday, 11 July

**Focus Session on Misspecified Models**

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<td>08.30</td>
<td>Causal Narratives and Political Polarization</td>
<td>*Rani Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and CEPR)</td>
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<td>09.30</td>
<td>Learning (Not to Trade?) in Large Worlds</td>
<td>*Larry Samuelson (Yale University)</td>
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<td>10.30</td>
<td>Coffee break</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>Competing Models</td>
<td>*Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University)</td>
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<td>Modeling Ignorance without Bayesian Beliefs</td>
<td>*Olivier Compte (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economique)</td>
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<td>Investigation with forgetful liars</td>
<td>*Philippe Jehiel (University College London)</td>
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Thursday, 12 July

Morning Session
08.30 – 09.30 | Information Design in Misspecified Social Learning Models
*Daniel Hauser (Aalto University)

Evening Parallel Sessions
20.30 – 21.30 | The Value of a Coordination Game
*Willemien Kets (University of Oxford)
| An Explanation-Based approach to Combining Forecasts
*Ronny Razin (London School of Economics and CEPR)

Friday, 13 July

Morning Session
08.30 – 09.30 | Incentive compatible estimators
*Kfir Eliaz (Tel Aviv University and CEPR)

Morning Parallel Session
10.00 – 11.00 | Equilibrium Counterfactuals
*Gilles Chemla (Imperial College, London and CEPR)
| Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations
*Heidi Thysen (London School of Economics)

* Indicates the presenter

ESSET 2018 Organisers:
Dirk Bergemann (Yale and CEPR)
Alessandro Bonatti (MIT Sloan and CEPR)
Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton)
Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR)
Dezső Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR)
Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and CEPR)

Standing organising committee for ESSET:
Chair: Dezső Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR)
Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR), Margaret Meyer (Oxford University and CEPR), Stephen Morris (Princeton University), Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR), Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR), Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR), Sven Rady (University of Bonn and CEPR), Joel Sobel (University of California, San Diego), Xavier Vives (IESE Business School, Barcelona and CEPR) and Lucy White (Boston University and CEPR)