EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY

Generously hosted by
Study Center Gerzensee

Monday 2 – Friday 13 July 2012

PROGRAMME

WEEK 1

MONDAY 2 JULY

Morning Sessions

08.30 - 09.45  Mismatch, Rematch and Investment  
Thomas Gall (University of Bonn)  
*Patrick Legros (ECARES)  
Andrew Newman (Boston University)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30  Matching Multidimensional Types  
Ilse Lindenlaub (European University Institute)  
Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules  
*Tilman Börgers (University of Michigan)  
Doug Smith (Federal Trade Commission)

TUESDAY 3 JULY

Focus Session on Matching

Chair: Jan Eeckhout (University College of London and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

08.30 - 09.45  Surplus Division and Efficient Matching  
Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn)

10.15 - 11.30  Matching Information  
*Hector Chade (Arizona State University)  
Jan Eeckhout (University College of London and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30  Decision-Making and Implementation in Teams  
*Marc Möller (Universität Bern)  
Jordi Blanes-i-Vidal (London School of Economics)  
Child Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race  
*Maria Giovanna Baccara (Washington University, St Louis)  
Allan Collard-Wexler (New York University)  
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)  
Leeat Yariv (California Institute of Technology)
**WEDNESDAY 4 JULY**

**Morning Sessions**

08.30 - 09.45  Inequality and Risk-Taking Behaviour  
Ed Hopkins (University of Edinburgh)

**Evening Parallel Sessions**

20.30 - 21.30  Reciprocal Contracting  
Michael Peters (University of British Columbia)  
**Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets**  
*Marek Pycia (Université de Toulouse I)  
Qingmin Liu (University of Pennsylvania)*

**THURSDAY 5 JULY**

**Focus Session on Matching**

*Chair: Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)*

08.30 - 09.45  Matching with Incomplete Information  
*Qingmin Liu (University of Pennsylvania)  
George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)  
Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)  
Larry Samuelson (Yale University)*

10.15 - 11.30  Stable Marriage and Search Frictions  
Stefan Lauermann (University of Michigan)  
Georg Nöldeke (Universität Bonn and CEPR)

**Evening Parallel Sessions**

20.30 - 21.30  The Supermodular Stochastic Ordering: Applications  
*Margaret Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR)  
Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)*  
**Do Smarter Consumers Get Better Advice? An Analytical Framework and Evidence from German Private Pensions**  
*Tabea Bucher-Koenen (Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, Munich)  
Johannes Koenen (Universität Bonn)*

**FRIDAY 6 JULY**

**Morning Sessions**

08.30 – 09:30  Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching  
*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University College London and CEPR)  
Ed Hopkins (University of Edinburgh)*

**Morning Parallel Sessions**

10:00 – 11:00  Pay-for-luck in CEO compensation: matching and efficient contracting  
Pierre Chaigneau (HEC Montréal)  
*Nicolas Sahuguet (Ecole des HEC)*  
**Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets**  
*Renato Gomes (Toulouse School of Economics)  
Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)*
**WEEK 2**

**MONDAY 9 JULY**

**Morning Sessions**

08.30 – 09:45 | Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters  
| Heski Bar-Isaac (New York University)  
| *Joyee Deb (New York University)

**Evening Parallel Sessions**

20.30 - 21.30 | Rational Inattention and Organizational Focus  
| *Wouter Dessein (Columbia University Business School and CEPR)  
| Andrea Galeotti (University of Essex)  
| Tano Santos (Columbia University and CEPR)

**TUESDAY 10 JULY**

**Focus Session on Communication and Information**

*Chair:* Marco Ottaviani (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University and CEPR)

08.30 - 09.45 | A Conversational War of Attrition  
| Katalin Bognar (University of California, Los Angeles)  
| *Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (University of California, Los Angeles)  
| Lones Smith (University of Wisconsin)

10.15 - 11.30 | In-Uck Park (University of Bristol)

**Evening Parallel Sessions**

20.30 - 21.30 | Manipulative Disclosure  
| Claudio Mezzetti (University of Warwick)

| Targeted Communication, Selective Disclosure, and Privacy  
| Florian Hoffmann (Goethe University Frankfurt)  
| Roman Inderst (Goethe University Frankfurt and CEPR)  
| Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR)

**WEDNESDAY 11 JULY**

**Morning Sessions**

08.30 - 09.45 | A Large-Market Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model  
| Xavier Vives (IESE, Barcelona-Madrid and CEPR)

**Evening Parallel Sessions**

20.30 - 21.30 | Cheap Talk With Two-Sided Private Information  
| Inés Moreno de Barreda

| Uniqueness and Comparative Statics in the Strategic Information Transmission Game  
| Dezsö Szalay (Universität Bonn)
THURSDAY 12 JULY

Focus Session on Communication and Information

Chair: Dezsö Szalay (Universität Bonn)

08.30 - 09.45 Selling Information
* Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR)
Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford University)

10.15 - 11.30 Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market
* William Fuchs (University of California Berkeley)
Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford University)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30 Optimal Delay in Committees
Ettore Damiano (University of Toronto)
* Hao Li (University of British Columbia)
Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong)

A Folk Theorem with Mediated Communication
David Rahman (University of Minnesota)

FRIDAY 13 JULY

Morning Sessions

08.30 - 09.30 Queues and Experiments
Martin Cripps (University College London)
* Caroline Thomas (University of Texas, Austin)

Morning Parallel Sessions

10.00- 11.00 Buybacks and opportunism in vertical contracting
João Montez (London Business School)

Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case
* Tymofiy Mylovanov (Penn State University)
Thomas Tröger (Universität Mannheim)

* Indicates the presenter.

Organisers:

Jan Eeckhout (University College London and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR)
Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn)

Organising Committee:

Jan Eeckhout (University College London and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Christian Hellwig (University of California, Los Angeles and CEPR)
Matthew O. Jackson (Stanford University)
Margaret Meyer (Oxford University and CEPR)
Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR)
Andrea Prat (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Sven Rady (Universität München and CEPR)
Patrick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR)
Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University)
Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn)
Juuso Välimäki (Helsinki School of Economics and CEPR)
Timothy Van Zandt (INSEAD and CEPR)
Xavier Vives (IESE Business School, Barcelona-Madrid and CEPR)
Lucy White (Harvard Business School and CEPR)