European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET)

Studienzentrum Gerzensee, 5/16 July 2004

Programme

WEEK 1

Monday 5 July

08:30 – 09:30 The Impact of Leniency Programs on Cartels
*Patrick Rey (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR)
Cecile Aubert (Univ. Paris IX Dauphine)
William Kovacic (George Washington University)

09:50 – 10:50 Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?
*Volker Nocke (University of Pennsylvania)
Lucy White (Harvard Business School)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30 Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions
John Asker (Harvard University)
*Estelle Cantillon (Harvard Business School and CEPR)

20:30 – 21:30 Competitive Experimentation with Private Information
Guiseppe Moscarini (Yale University)
*Francesco Squintani (University College London)

Tuesday 6 July

08:30 – 11:30 Focus Session: Law and Economics

Session Organizer: Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts
*Steven Shavell (Harvard University)

Legal Applications of Contract Theory
*Alan Schwartz (Yale University)
Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30  **Design and Enforcement of Legal Standards**
*Giovanni Immordino (Universita di Salerno)*
Marco Pagano (Universita di Salerno)

20:30 – 21:30  **Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders**
*Winand Emons (Universität Bern and CEPR)*

**Wednesday 7 July**

08:30 – 09:30  **Firm-Specific Training**
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
*Christopher Harris (King’s College, Cambridge)*

09:50 – 10:50  **Employer Learning and General Human Capital**
*Jan Eeckhout (University of Pennsylvania)*

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30  **Flexible Contracts**
Paolo Ghirardato (University of Turin)
*Piero Gottardi (University of Venice)*
Jean-Marc Tallon (Universite Paris I)

20:30 – 21:30  **A Smooth Model of Decision Making Under Ambiguity**
Peter Klibanoff (Northwestern University)
Massimo Marinacci (University of Turin)
*Sujoy Mukerji (University of Oxford)*

**Thursday 8 July**

08:30 – 11:30  **Focus Session: Allocation Mechanisms without Prices**
Session Organizer: Michele Piccione (London School of Economics)

**Social Assets**
*George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)*
Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)
Better Mechanism Design by Transferring Utilities Across Agents via Non-monetary Instruments
*Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Columbia University)

Equilibria in the Jungle
*Michele Piccione (London School of Economics)
Ariel Rubinstein (Tel-Aviv University and New York University)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30 Qualitative Voting
*Rafael Hortala-Vallve (London School of Economics)

20:30 – 21:30 A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights
*Abhinay Muthoo (University of Essex)

Friday 9 July

08:30 – 09:30 Multidimensional Cheap Talk
*Gilat Levy (London School of Economics and CEPR)
*Ronny Razin (New York University and CEPR)

09:50 – 10:50 Competition over Non-Bayesian Agents
*Ran Spiegler (Tel-Aviv University)

Evening Session:

20:30 – 21:30 Contracting in the Shadow of the Law
*Nicola Gennaioli (Harvard University)

20:30 – 21:30 Discretion and Partisans
*Elisabetta Iossa (Brunel University)
Giuliana Palumbo (Bank of Italy)
Week 2

Monday 12 July

08:30 - 09:30  Building Rational Cooperation
James Andreoni (University of Wisconsin)
*Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)

9:50 - 10:50  Media as Watchdogs: The Role of News Media in Electoral Competition
*Jimmy Chan (John Hopkins University)
Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30  Party Governance and Electoral Competition
Micael Castanheira (Universite Libre de Bruxelles)
Benoit Crutzen (Universite Libre de Bruxelles)
*Nicolas Sahuguet (Universite Libre de Bruxelles)

20:30 - 21:30  Reputational Cheap Talk or Late Informed Betting and the Favourite-Long Shot Bias
*Marco Ottaviani (London Business School and CEPR)
*Peter Sorensen (Kobenhavns Universitet)

20:30 - 21:30  Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University of Essex)
George J Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Stephen Morris (Yale University)

Tuesday 13 July

08:30 - 11:30  Focus Session: Models of Reputation
Session Organizer: Jeffrey Ely (Boston University)

Reputation in the Short-, Medium-, and Long-Run
Jeffrey Ely (Boston University)

Career Concerns in Financial Markets
Amil Dasgupta (London School of Economics)
*Andrea Prat (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
*Martin Cripps (Washington University, St. Louis)
*George J Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30  **Static Efficiency and Dynamic Incentives**
*Heski Bar-Isaac (New York University)
Juanjo Ganuza (U. Pompeu Fabra)

20:30 - 21:30  **Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations**
Philippe Jehiel (CERAS-ENPC, University College London and CEPR)
*Frederic Koessler (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

Wednesday 14 July

08:30 - 9:30  **Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Auctions**
*Ian Jewitt (Nuffield College, Oxford and CEPR)

09:50 - 10:50  **Towards a Theory of Deception**
*David Ettinger (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)
Philippe Jehiel (CERAS-ENPC and University College London)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30  **Principal and Expert Agent**
*James Malcomson (University of Oxford)

20:30 - 21:30  **Iterative Dominance and the Theory of Sequential Bargaining**
*Christopher Tyson (Nuffield College, Oxford)

Thursday 15 July

08:30 - 11:30  **Focus Session: Strategic Behavior and Educational Outcomes**
Session Organizer:  Christopher Avery (Harvard University)

**School Choice at Boston Public Schools**
*Tayfun Sonmez (Koç University)
Categorical Redistribution in Winner-Take-All Markets
*Roland Fryer (Harvard University)
Glenn Loury (Boston University)

Equilibrium Information Disclosure: Grade Inflation and Unraveling
Michael Ostrovsky (Harvard University)
*Michael Schwarz (Harvard University)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30 Single-Agent Mechanism Design with Risk Averse Parties
*Dezso Szalay (Université de Lausanne)

20:30 - 21:30 To Bundle or Not to Bundle or Public Provision of Private Goods
Hanming Fang (Yale University)
*Peter Norman (University of Wisconsin)

Friday 16 July

08:30 - 09:30 Post-Schooling Wage Growth: Investment, Search, and Learning
Yona Rubinstein (Tel-Aviv University)
*Yoram Weiss (Tel-Aviv University)

9:50 - 10:50 Reverse Discrimination and Efficiency in Education
*Gianni de Fraja (University of York and CEPR)

* denotes speaker