ESSET
European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory
Travel Costs Sponsored by the Society for Economic Analysis Ltd
Gerzensee, 14/18 July 2003

Programme

Monday 14 July

08:30 – 11:30  Focus Session: Computer Science and Economics
Session Organizers: Noam Nisan (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Ilya Segal (Stanford University)

Rationality as Paradigm for Internet Computing
Noam Nisan (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Communication Complexity and Mechanism Design
Timothy van Zandt (INSEAD, Fontainebleau and CEPR)

The Price of Anarchy in Some Network Games
Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30  Incomplete Information and Multiple Machine Queuing Problems
Manipushpak Mitra (Indian Statistical Institute)

20:30 – 21:30  Complexity as a Barrier to Competitive Imitation
Nabir Al-Najjar (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)
Tuesday 15 July

08:30 – 10:30  Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium  
*Motty Perry (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) 
*Philip Reny (University of Chicago) 

Auction Based Queue Disciplines  
*Thomas Kittsteiner (Nuffield College, University of Oxford)  
Benny Moldovanu (Universität Bonn and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30  Rationalization and Incomplete Information  
*Pierpaolo Battigalli (Università Bocconi)  
Marciano Siniscalchi

20:30 – 21:30  Innovation Timing Games: A General Framework with Applications  
Ulrich Lehmann Grube (Universität Hamburg)  
*Heidrun Hoppe (Universität Bonn and CEPR)

Wednesday 16 July

08:30 – 11:30  Focus Session: Biology and Economics  

Session Organizers:  
Ted Bergstrom (University of California)  
Arthur Robson (University of Western Ontario)

A "Bioeconomic" View of the Neolithic and Recent Demographic Transitions  
Arthur Robson (University of Western Ontario)

Storage for Good Times and Bad: Of Squirrels and Men  
Ted Bergstrom (University of California)

Evolution of Focal Points  
*Kenneth Binmore (University College London)  
Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30  The Evolution of Coordination under Inertia  
Thomas Norman (Nuffield College, University of Oxford)

20:30 – 21:30  Matching, Time and Ageing  
Avner Shaked (Universität Bonn)
Thursday 17 July

08:30 – 11:30

**Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations**
Martin Cripps (Washington University, St Louis)
*George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin, Madison)

**Valuation Equilibrium**
*Philippe Jehiel (CERAS, Paris, University College London and CEPR)
Dov Samet (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 – 21:30

**Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments**
*Christian Groh (Universität Bonn)
Benny Moldovanu (Universität Bonn and CEPR)
Aner Sela (Ben-Gurion University)

20:30 – 21:30

**The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options**
Deszö Szalay (HEC, University of Lausanne)

Friday 18 July

08:30 – 10:30

**Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?**
*Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University)
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

**Social learning with Private and Common Values**
Jacob Goeree (University of Amsterdam)

* denotes speaker

Organizers:
Mark Armstrong (Nuffield College, University of Oxford, and CEPR)
Philippe Bacchetta (Studienzentrum Gerzensee, Université de Lausanne and CEPR)
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Philippe Jehiel (CERAS, Paris, University College London and CEPR)
Patrick Legros (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Université de Liège and CEPR)
Margaret A Meyer (Nuffield College, University of Oxford, and CEPR)
Benny Moldovanu (Universität Mannheim and CEPR)
Patrick Rey (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR)
Xavier Vives (INSEAD, Fontainebleau and CEPR)