European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory

3/14 July 1995, Gerzensee

Revised Final Programme

Monday 3 July

Afternoon  
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics  
Tilman Börgers (University College London)  
Rajiv Sarin (Texas A&M University)

Discussant:  
Christopher Harris (Nuffield College, Oxford)

Evening  
Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria  
Philippe Jéhie1 (CERAS, Paris)

Tuesday 4 July

Workshop on Bounded Rationality

Some Thoughts on Models of Bounded Rationality  
Ariel Rubinstein (Tel Aviv University)

Complexity and Network in Repeated Games II: General Strategies  
Inkoo Choo (University of Chicago)  
Hao Li (University of Chicago)

Complexity Costs and the Incompleteness of Contracts  
Luca Anderlini (St. John’s College, Cambridge)  
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)
Wednesday 5 July

Morning

**Auctions vs. Negotiations**
Jeremy Bulow (Stanford University)
Pau Klemperer (St Catherine's College, Oxford and CEPR)

Discussant:
Klaus Schmidt (Universität Bonn)

Evening

**Social Learning and Costly Information Acquisition**
Roberto Burguet (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona)
Xavier Vives (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona and CEPR)

Thursday 6 July

**Workshop on Market Design**

**Issues in the Design of New Markets, How to Set a Minimum Acceptable Bids**
R Preston McAfee (University of Texas)

**Designing and Playing the Game: the US Spectrum Auction**
Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

**How (Not to) Sell to Interacting Buyers**
Philippe Jéhiel (CERAS, Paris)
Benny Moldovanu (Universität Bonn)
Aennio Stachetti (Michigan University)

**Multi-Object Auctions: On the Use of Combinational Bids**
Fernando Branco (Universidade Católica Portuguesa and CEPR)

Friday 7 July

Morning

**Demand and Supply in New Markets: Diffusion with Bilateral Learning**
Nikolaos Vettas (Duke University)

Discussant:
Kai-Uwe Kühn (IAE and CEPR)

Evening

**Optimal Patent Renewals**
Francesca Cornelli (London Business School and CEPR)
Mark Schankerman (EBRD)
Monday 10 July

Morning  A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
Matthew O Jackson (Northwestern University)
Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern University)

Discussant:  Patrick Bolton (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles and CEPR)

Evening  How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?
George J Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)
Jeroen R Swinkels (Northwestern University)

Tuesday 11 July

Morning  Multi-Dimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behaviour in Financial Markets
Christopher Avery (Harvard University)
Peter Zemsky (INSEAD)

Discussant:  Peter Sørensen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Evening  Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Incomes Sources
Inés Macho-Stampfer (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
J David Pérez-Castrillo (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Wednesday 12 July

Morning  Bargaining and Investment in a Two-Sided Matching Model
Harold L Cole (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)
George J Mallath (University of Pennsylvania)
Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

Discussant:  József Sàkoviks (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona)

Evening  Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Markets Games
Luis Corchón (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas y Universidad de Alicante)
Simon Wilkie (California Institute of Technology)
Thursday 13 July

**Half-Day Workshop on Information in Organizations**

**Incentives in M-Form and U-Form Organizations**
Eric S Maskin (Harvard University)
Yingyi Qian (Stanford University)
Chenggang Xu (London School of Economics)

**Evening**

**Disclosure of Know-How in Research Joint Ventures**
J David Pérez Castrillo (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Joel Sandonis (Universidad del País Vasco)

Friday 14 July

**Market Structure and the Growth Process**
Philippe Aghion (EBRD, London and CEPR)
Mathias Dewatripont (ECARE and CEPR)
Patrick Rey (ENSAE-CREST and CEPR)

Discussant: John Roberts (Stanford University)